At the end of WAC-3 in New
Delhi, a Committee was set up to investigate
the ban on discussion of the Ayodhya issue
at the Congress. At its meeting in Cape
Town, Council asked that the text of the
Committee’s report be disseminated
to members. It is produced below with slight
editorial amendment.
A Report To The Executive Of The World
Archaeological Congress
Michael Rowlands and Pedro Funari
Introduction
We were asked to report to the Council
on the circumstances leading to the ban
on discussion of the Ayodhya issue at WAC
3 in Delhi December 1994. We understood
our brief to be limited to the events that
displayed weaknesses in the procedures for
consultation and decision making and how
these might be avoided in future.
To achieve these aims we interviewed two
members of the WAC Executive of 1994, Professor
Jack Golson and Professor Peter Ucko, and
two members of the organising committee
in India, Professor B.B. Lal and Dr Makkam
Lal. Whilst there was some disagreement
over the recall of events, we did not make
any attempt to establish the veracity of
statements and consider them here only in
so far they demonstrate weaknesses in consultative
and decision-making procedures.
Background
The key issue concerns the decision by
the WAC Executive in Delhi in 1994 to ban
discussion of the Ayodhya issue at the Congress
in response to external pressures. Based
on the interviews and without any insider
knowledge of the issues, neither author
of the report feels competent to make nor
would wish to make any statement about the
wisdom of this particular decision.
However, we can point to a sequence of
events which suggests the Ayodhya issue
had been raised earlier than this on at
least two occasions and that some lessons
on good practice can be drawn from what
happened.
All parties agreed that the Ayodhya issue
had been discussed initially at the inter-congress
in Mombasa in 1992 and the problem this
posed for free and open discussion had been
recognised by the local organisers and by
both members of the Executive. The former
believe that it was accepted that every
attempt would be made to exclude discussion
of Ayodhya at the Congress and that this
was subsequently revoked by Professor Golson.
Professors Golson and Ucko deny this but
claim instead that it was recognised that
such a sensitive issue would require special
attention. The latter also claim that an
offer was made by the WAC Executive to provide
specialist advice on how to deal with such
a conflict of interest and this was rejected
by the Indian committee. The Executive did
not feel they could impose this advice and
the offer lapsed.
Professor Golson went to India in March
93 to advise on the organisation of the
Congress and he expressed his personal worries
about the BJP coming to power in India and
the effects this might have if the new government
was funding the Congress. The question of
funding and impartiality had apparently
not been raised until then. It was also
recognised, perhaps for the first time,
that the date of the Congress would fall
on the second anniversary of the destruction
of the Ayodhya mosque and this could be
a time when violence could easily be triggered.
Professor B.B. Lal claimed that on this
occasion Professor Golson went back on his
earlier undertaking not to allow discussion
of Ayodhya at the Congress and raised the
issue of the principle of free speech and
open discussion. By this time there were
also tensions between the Executive and
the local Indian organisers over money and
rights to publication and semi-repressed
anxieties over how well the local committee
was coping with the strains of organising
a large international congress. Dr Lal obviously
still feels considerable grievance and complained
that neither he personally nor Indian archaeology
in general had received any benefit from
holding the Congress.
In July 1994, JG and PU went to Delhi by
invitation to discuss a call by Nadini Rao
for a session to be organised on the Ayodhya
issue at the Congress. It would appear that
the threat of a boycott or the threat of
external political interference in the Congress
became apparent at this meeting. A compromise
was claimed by the Executive members that
whilst there would not be a special session
since there was insufficient time to organise
one, papers on Ayodhya could be presented
at any session in the Congress. The organisers
claimed that the government had been assured
that there would be no special discussion
of the Ayodhya issue at the Congress and
even individual papers would cause difficulties.
The ban on discussion of the Ayodhya issue
took place immediately prior to the opening
of the Congress under the threat that the
Congress and delegates could not be protected
from possible violent consequences if discussion
took place or a resolution condemning the
destruction of cultural property was passed
at the Plenary. There was disagreement about
whether this was actually said at the meeting
with the Indian Minister, was the Executive
going back on previous understandings, was
the WAC constitution sufficiently clear
on what would form an infringement of its
statutes and suspicions expressed about
attempts to ‘bump’ the Executive
into initiating a ban. Since the Congress
was about to start and delegates had either
already arrived or were in flight, a nightmarish
choice was presented of either of issuing
the ban on the one hand, or cancelling the
Congress on the other, on the basis that
the principle of free speech and open discussion
had been impugned (in a manner clearly different
from the prior experience of the ban on
South African participation, which was not
intended to exclude issues from discussion).
The question this raises for our report
however is not whether the Executive made
the right decision but whether the decision
could have been taken earlier and more proactively.
Recommendations for discussion
We have outlined certain events neither
to present a full account of ‘what
happened’ nor to verify accounts of
what happened but as illustrations of weakness
in consultative and organisational procedures.
We suggest the following points for discussion
by the Executive:
- Is there a clear statement in the WAC
statutes about the principles of free
speech and open discussion at a Congress
or Inter-Congress and that any interference
on this principle cannot be tolerated?
- Is it clearly stated that the local
organising committee of a Congress or
Inter-Congress is expected to adhere to
this principle and agree to do so in some
formal manner?
- Are the President and Officers expected
to pronounce on behalf of WAC and are
they empowered by the WAC Executive to
speak on its behalf? Is the President
allowed to act without consulting the
Executive or Council, particularly if
time does not allow for this?
- How are decisions made on whether actions
by local organising committees or members
of the Executive infringe the WAC constitution?
- How was it possible for the Ayodhya
issue to have been raised several times
over a two-year period, and its possible
implications clearly recognised, without
an emergency meeting of the WAC Executive
being called to decide what to do? The
Ayodhya issue was not introduced at the
last minute and yet for many it appeared
wrongly to have been so.
- Based on this experience, relations
between local organising committees and
the WAC Executive require reconsideration.
There is clearly a reluctance by members
of the Executive to appear to be interfering
or showing a lack of confidence in local
organisation. However, it should be possible
to require as part of the agreement to
organise a Congress that the local committee
should be informed of those matters about
which it must consult the WAC Executive..
It appears that there was considerable
lack of clarity regarding the relative
responsibilities of the WAC Executive,
some of its officers and the local Indian
organising committee.
- In 1994 there was too much background
acrimony over money, rights to publication,
and general control of resources. Also,
we gained a sense that an atmosphere of
general and unending emergency pervaded,
with flying visits and expert advice being
offered for open discussion but with an
absence of confidence- raising over the
Congress in general. This constituted
a poor background for dealing with the
particular issue of Ayodhya and meant
that relations of trust had already been
undermined .
We present these opinions as items for
discussion based on our limited opportunities
to discuss the issues with four main participants.
We do not pretend to know the history in
full, and we have written our report on
that basis. We present the foregoing suggestions
in a spirit of initiating discussion.
Both Council and Executive discussed the
Report and Officers have been tasked to
ensure that all appropriate action possible
is taken to ensure that a similar situation
does not arise again. |
World
Archaeological Bulletin